"Humanae Vitae" is a definitive teaching of the authoritative and authentic interpreter of the divine and natural law and is therefore gravely binding in conscience.

Setting optimal significance levels that minimize Type I and Type II errors allows for more transparent and well‐considered statistical decision making compared to the traditional α = 0.05 significance level. We use the optimal α approach to re‐assess conclusions reached by three recently published tests of the pace‐of‐life syndrome hypothesis, which attempts to unify occurrences of different physiological, behavioral, and life history characteristics under one theory, over different scales of biological organization. While some of the conclusions reached using optimal α (...) were consistent to those previously reported using the traditional α = 0.05 threshold, opposing conclusions were also frequently reached. The optimal α approach reduced probabilities of Type I and Type II errors, and ensured statistical significance was associated with biological relevance. Biologists should seriously consider their choice of α when conducting null hypothesis significance tests, as there are serious disadvantages with consistent reliance on the traditional but arbitrary α = 0.05 significance level. (shrink)

This is a new edition of Joseph Fletcher's 1966 work that ignited a firestorm of controversy at the time of its publication.

This dissertation had three purposes: present the system of natural law developed by Germain Grisez and John Finnis; display and examine their quarrel with that group of moralists they label "proportionalists;" adjudicate crucial areas of conflict to advance a person-centered fundamental morality. ;Chapter One presented the Grisez-Finnis system. It noted: their emphasis on intentionality, as opposed to metaphysical anthropology, as the ground of their theory of practical reason--morality; and their identification of objective principles for grounding moral absolutes. ;Chapter Two detailed (...) their critique of the "proportionalists," including Richard McCormick S.J. These are charged with: violating value incommensurability by trying to determine rightness by simple weighing; neglecting the way willing shapes an agent's basic dispositions--moral character, particularly in intending means; and, emphasizing emotional attitude as constituting moral character instead of recognizing attitude--character as one's "volitional self-disposition," to be ordered and constrained by rational principles. ;Chapter Three presented proportionalist responses to the critique. While some incompleteness and vagueness was observed, the fundamental charges of Grisez and Finnis seemed to be unconfirmed. ;Chapter Four further examined two crucial disputed areas: the possibilities of justifying actions by ordering values; the way intention--action impacts on moral character. Use was made of tools provided by the theorists already considered, with additional insights from: other natural law theorists, e.g. H. Veatch; R. Sokolowski's phenomenological perspective; and some elements of a nuanced noncognitivism. A person-centered point of view was established as key to valuing and justifying. ;I concluded that a person-centered morality did offer a higher good in light of which basic goods could be ordered, opening some possibility of "Doing Evil to Achieve Good", i.e. using harmful means for a proportionately good end. Personal moral goodness was identified in terms of one's basic commitments--basic volitional and emotionl self-dispositions. Actions and elements of actions are to be evaluated, as to effect on moral goodness, according to how they express and affect basic commitments. (shrink)

This essay explores and interprets two texts from Parochial and Plain Sermons in light of Newman’s understanding of religious imagination—specifically, the act of realization. Both texts suggest that for Newman, realization is a type of self-appropriation by which a fact or an object is assimilated . One sermon concerns the Passion, the other the Resurrection. He indicates that when the object of the imagination is Christ, realization comes about through meditation on Scripture, and produces a stronger or weaker vision of (...) Jesus in the soul based on one’s personal dispositions. It is often employed when the mind engages in conflicting ideas, such as Christ as both God and man. (shrink)

This paper argues that if the world is irreducibly stochastic, then both Salmon's S-R model of explanation and Fetzer's C-R model of explanation have the following undesirable consequence: the objective probability (associated with the model's relevance condition) of any actual macro-event is either undefined or else, if defined, it equals one--so that the event is not even a candidate for a probabilistic explanation. This result follows from the temporal ambiguity of ontic probability in an irreducibly stochastic world. It is argued (...) further that an analogous difficulty faces those theories of probabilistic causality which depend upon the notions of contributing and counteracting causes. Because of the problem of temporal ambiguity, it is not possible to objectively label a particular event as a contributing (or a counteracting) cause of some subsequent event. The argument is carried through in detail for a recent theory of probabilistic causality proposed by Paul Humphreys. (shrink)

The author of the acclaimed Gay Fiction Speaks brings us new interviews with twelve prominent gay writers who have emerged in the last decade. Hear Us Out demonstrates how in recent decades the canon of gay fiction has developed, diversified, and expanded its audience into the mainstream. Readers will recognize names like Michael Cunningham, whose Pulitzer Prize-winning novel The Hours inspired the hit movie; and others like Christopher Bram, Bernard Cooper, Stephen McCauley, and Matthew Stadler. These accounts explore the vicissitudes (...) of writing on gay male themes in fiction over the last thirty years--prejudices of the literary marketplace; social and political questions; the impact of AIDS; commonalities between gay male and lesbian fiction... and even some delectable bits of gossip. (shrink)

Voices are a complex and rich acoustic signal processed in an extensive cortical brain network. Specialized regions within this network support voice perception and production and may be differentially affected in pathological voice processing. For example, the experience of hallucinating voices has been linked to hyperactivity in temporal and extra-temporal voice areas, possibly extending into regions associated with vocalization. Predominant self-monitoring hypotheses ascribe a primary role of voice production regions to auditory verbal hallucinations. Alternative postulations view a generalized perceptual salience (...) bias as causal to AVH. These theories are not mutually exclusive as both ascribe the emergence and phenomenology of AVH to unbalanced top-down and bottom-up signal processing. The focus of the current study was to investigate the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying predisposition brain states for emergent hallucinations, detached from the effects of inner speech. Using the temporal voice area localizer task, we explored putative hypersalient responses to passively presented sounds in relation to hallucination proneness. Furthermore, to avoid confounds commonly found in in clinical samples, we employed the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale for the quantification of HP levels in healthy people across an experiential continuum spanning the general population. We report increased activation in the right posterior superior temporal gyrus during the perception of voice features that positively correlates with increased HP scores. In line with prior results, we propose that this right-lateralized pSTG activation might indicate early hypersensitivity to acoustic features coding speaker identity that extends beyond own voice production to perception in healthy participants prone to experience AVH. (shrink)

Introduction : the faces of merit -- Republic of merit -- Merit and the culture of public life -- Small worlds : competition in the colleges -- Making the grade : managed competition and schooling -- The scientific measurement of merit -- The "presumption of merit" : institutionalizing merit -- Squeeze play : merit in government -- Merit in crisis -- Epilogue : merit, equality, consent.

Mathematical expressions for the entropyS, the average information gained per trial (Ī) from information theory, and the de Broglie cyclical action integralA from his reinterpretation of wave mechanics are shown to be similar. The importance of this observation in our understanding ofS andĪ is considered. Furthermore, the similarity in the mathematical form of these functions indicates a possible route to further interpretation of de Broglie'sA and the nature of his “hidden thermostat.”.

Comments on the views on free will offered by B. D. Slife , M. Gergen , R. N. Williams , M. S. Richardson , and G. S. Howard in light of the classical definition of FW as being capable of doing otherwise. It is argued that FW interpretations differ markedly depending on whether they are viewed as due to a process or to contents within some process. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

Many scientists proclaim that consciousness is an illusion, a mere byproduct of chemical activity in the brain. In the computer age, scholars have further conceptualized consciousness as the software that regulates human functions, reducing our foibles and feats to complex but ultimately predictable robotics.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10.1 (2000) 103-108 [Access article in PDF] Letters "Small Sacrifices" in Stem Cell Research Madam: I agree with Professors McGee and Caplan (in their article "The Ethics and Politics of Small Sacrifices in Stem Cell Research," KIEJ, June 1999) that the question of the nature and status of the source of stem cells must be addressed. However, in their eagerness to convince us of (...) the smallness of the sacrifices, I think the authors use some unfortunate rhetorical devices and move much too quickly over some necessary distinctions.The rhetorical display is unfortunate if the article is intended to be a fair and rational development of an argument--e.g., those who hold a position in opposition to the authors do not argue they "inveigh." The section on the political area of the controversy seems particularly dismissive of other's positions.However, I will focus on just two areas where I think a more nuanced consideration would make the question of the moral legitimacy of the "small sacrifices" of embryos less obvious than the authors' rhetoric would suggest.First, they claim that opponents of such research assume some sort of "super status" for an embryo. The rights generally conceded to born human beings may not be as "weak" as they characterize. But even considering only the "negative right against unwarranted violence," I think the authors misdescribe the situation. Contrary to their assertion, I do not know when "adults and even children are... forced to give life... in the defense or at least interest of the community's highest ideals and most pressing interests" (p. 153). Could they be speaking of capital punishment, justified in the name of protecting the community? But then why mention children?It is true that not everyone can be guaranteed every means to preserving and enhancing life. But this limitation on positive rights is not a "forced giving." Adults may be compelled to risk life--e.g. in a draft for the sake of a war. But, again, the more or less justifiable imposition of a risk is not the same as selecting out one particular individual or class to be directly killed. Neither adults nor born children are compelled to be killed for the sake of organ "donation," even if a greater number might be saved. If one grants equivalent status to the embryo (as the authors seem to do here for the sake of argument), opponents do not have to claim a "super status" for embryos, just the ordinary human right not to be killed even for "compassionate" motives.A second area where I think the authors move too quickly is in their impoverished definition of the essential humanity of the early embryo as exhaustively represented by the physical structure of its DNA. The authors seem to recognize [End Page 103] that, ordinarily, there is more to personhood than sheer physical structure. For example, they mention memories and habits (p. 154). They could also speak of relationships, attitudes, and the like. Since an early embryo has no such components of personality as we experience it, the authors hold that its identity could only be contained in its DNA. Since this DNA is preserved, even spread far and wide, by the use of stem cells, it almost seems as if we are doing the early embryo a favor by breaking it up.However, just because the embryo does not have any conscious memories or other attributes of character or personality, that does not mean its identity is constituted only by its physical structure described statically. The early embryo is not just a bundle of discrete structures, and its DNA is not just an inert lump made up of certain smaller lumps. Both the embryo and its DNA are active. Thus the identity of even an early embryo includes both its current processes and the innate potential for further activity and development. Although lacking a conscious will, the early embryo is already in a sense an agent, already doing things--growing, changing, and heading toward something that... (shrink)

Questions of both a theoretical and methodological nature are raised concerning Harcum's interesting paper on the resolution of the free will issue. The theoretical questions deal with the meaning of "free" as the supposed capricious disregard of environmental circumstances, the theoretical perspective from which agency is construed, the sort of causation that is involved, the choice of a predication model rather than a mediation model, and the role of opposition in framing alternatives. Methodological questions raised center on the role of (...) the experimental instruction, manipulation of the independent variable, and the reliance on randomness or error variance in the validation of free will conceptions. It is concluded that Harcum's findings are consistent with human agency, but that his theoretical account requires some rethinking. (shrink)

As I view theorizing to be identical to thinking and have offered extensive discussions elsewhere of the nature and function of "a" theory, I would like to address the question of what I look for in a psychological theory from the adjectivial side of the phrase 'psychological theory." The term "psychological" means to me a point of view, descriptive account, formal explication, etc., of human behavior encompassing introspective terminology, based on final causation, as framed in dialectically generated and evaluated premises (...) that incorporate predication. I think that if we can have a psychological theory of this type we will come a lot closer to the understanding of human beings. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The relationship of words to the things they represent and to the mind that forms them has long been the subject of linguistic enquiry. Joseph Graham's challenging book takes this debate into the field of literary theory, making a searching enquiry into the nature of literary representation. It reviews the arguments of Plato's Cratylus on how words signify things, and of Chomsky's theory of the innate "natural" status of language (contrasted with Saussure's notion of its essential arbitrariness). In the (...) process, Graham explores the issues of meaning and intentionality in representation, and questions of how the mind represents the world. Graham's use of linguistic theories and models leads him to a new response to Wimsatt's notion of the verbal icon, Stanley Fish's concept of literature as self-consuming artifact, and de Man's idea of its function as an allegory of reading. In showing them in fact to be complementary, he transcends the current controversies among literary theorists, arguing that the solution lies not in epistemology or philosophy, but in psychology and the study of how literature teaches and why humans learn best by example. (shrink)

Based on the idea that God is all around us, the author provides a simple answer to one of history's most complex questions.

"The patriarch of medical ethics explains why some accepted ethical values need to catch up with the science of human reproduction and why newer reproductive methods can be more "natural" and humane than those they replace." -- from Publisher's site.

An interpretation of memory from the perspective of logical learning theory is presented. In contrast to traditional associationistic theories of learning and memory, which rest on mediation modeling, LLT rests on a predication model. Predication draws on formal and final causation whereas mediation is limited to material and efficient causation. It is held in LLT that memory begins in predicate organization, where framing meanings are logically extended to targets. Passage of time is irrelevant in this meaning extension. The effectiveness of (...) memory depends on the cohesiveness or "tightness" of meaningful organization as framed by a relevant context. Well-organized contexts facilitate memory and poorly organized contexts are detrimental to memory. Possible reasons for good or poor organization in memory are discussed, and relevant research findings cited. The paper closes with a separate definition of memory as a content and as a process. (shrink)

It is generally agreed that the method of explication consists in replacing a vague, presystematic notion (the explicandum) with a precise notion (the explicatum) formulated in a systematic context. However, Carnap and others who have used this and related terms appear to hold inconsistent views as to what constitutes an adequate explication. The central feature of the present explication of 'explication' is the correspondence condition: permitting the explicandum to deviate from some established "ordinary-language" conventions but, at the same time, requiring (...) that the explicatum correspond (via an effective translation) to the chosen "definitive intension" of the explicandum. (In effect, the first stages of an explication provide an informal characterization of a vague and possibly inconsistent language convention.) The present account of explication contrasts sharply with that sketched by Quine in Word and Object (although Quine accepts a correspondence condition of a sort). The terms `explication 1 ' and `explication 2 ' are used to indicate these quite different senses of the term. In Kaplan's terminology, explication 1 is intended to remedy "external vagueness" while explication 2 is intended to remedy "internal vagueness.". (shrink)